

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

REPORT

COUNTRY Germany (East Zone)/USSR

DATE DISTR. 11 JUNE 52

SUBJECT

Recent Electronics Returnees

NO. OF PAGES 2 25X1

PLACE ACQUIRED

NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)

DATE ACQUIRED

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO. 25X1

DATE OF

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Information

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1. All German specialists have now left NII 160 FRYASINO and are at present in East BERLIN.
2. most of the electronics returnees would find employment with the RFT FUNKWERK in BERLIN-KOPENICK and not at the OSW. The reason for this was that most of the specialists do not want to work for a Soviet organization after having been in Russia. A further reason was that most of them intensely dislike the present German Director of the OSW, Herr Direktor MUELLER.
3. Referring to the work carried out at NII 160, it was stated that most of the work consisted of copying and improving original American type radar equipment, most of which was designed for the 10 cm and 3 cm wave-bands. The German engineers were working together with quite a number of really good and capable Russian development engineers and designers but most of these were elderly men from the Czarist Regime or confirmed supporters of TROTSKY. it was thought that none of these Russians gave of their best but sabotaged the effort spent as far as they could without getting into trouble themselves.
4. So far as the factory production was concerned, in the early stages after the arrival of the German specialists at the end of 1946 rejects were approximately 50 to 60%. With the help of the German specialists, this rate was reduced to approximately 40%. About a year ago, i.e. at the beginning of 1951, instructions were received from the Ministry concerned that rejects were to be reduced to 20%, but at no time did the actual figure drop below 35%. Since the German specialists were gradually withdrawn from production work during the last six months the reject rate again rose sharply and is at present (April 1952) between 45 and 50%.
5. About three months before the outbreak of the Korean War the Germans noticed that there was something in the wind. Overnight all long term development work was cancelled and they were instructed to concentrate only on the short term tasks, which were to be pressed forward with all possible speed.

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6. [redacted] there was a large factory at SARATOV on the VOLGA, which factory produced complete aircraft transmitter sets complete with the required valves and aeri^{als}. 25X1
7. [redacted] Dr. NEIDHARDT returned on the same transport [redacted] with some of his assistants as well as a few specialists originally deported from BLEICHERODE. However, quite a number of Germans were still in Sanatorium MONINO, but they too hoped to return in the near future. 25X1
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8. BUSCHBECK, who until about twelve months ago or more was at the Sanatorium MONINO, and then transferred to MOSCOW with a few assistants, where he joined a group which had recently signed long term contracts. BUSCHBECK himself had signed a contract for four years and therefore would probably not return for another three years. [redacted] 25X1
9. ZIGANKE (ZYGANKE) was arrested by the MVD approximately eight months ago and since then nothing has been heard of him. [redacted] 25X1



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